Thursday, January 24, 2013

Aristotle's Physics Book II. 1-3, Nature as a Force of Change

Nature as a Force of Change

"For each of these has in itself a source of motion and rest... but a bed or a cloak, or any other such kind of thing there is, in the respect in which it has happened upon each designation and to the extent that it is from art, has no innate impulse of change at all." (192b p. 49-50)

"And everything that has a nature is an independent thing, since it is something that underlies [and persists through change], and nature is always in an underlying thing." (192b p.49-50)

"For what is potentially flesh or bone does not yet have its own nature, until it takes on the look that is disclosed in speech, that by means of which we define when we say what flesh or bone is, and not until then is it by nature." (193b p. 50-1)
Source: Aristotle, Physics, trans. J. Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. P, 2001).

     Aristotle's conceives of nature as a type of causation that is characterized by motion and change and is not incidental. After giving a brief look at his own view of nature and stating that it is based on the way we commonly speak about things and our intuitions, he presents two other views and their ways of defining the nature of a thing. One view does this by a method known as reduction and claims that the essential nature of something is in the most basic substance or material that are the fundamental building blocks. Someone holding this view would define something like water by the parts that make it up - Hydrogen, electrons, quarks, etc. They would argue that water is not defined by its property to quench our thirst or how we think and talk about it. They might give an example to show this, such as the fact that sea water doesn't relieve our thirst but it is still water. Their essential point is that the materials define the principle nature that makes something that particular thing.
     The second view directly contests with the previous point and Aristotle is more sympathetic to this line of thinking. Aristotle supports this view by suggesting that things are defined by their actuality by giving the example of flesh and bone towards the end of chapter two.  Aristotle recognizes that both views are getting something right and we can see this in his own view that "nature is twofold, and is both form and material". He goes on to argue that when studying nature we must go about studying both form and material aspects, but we can see from his comments on Plato that he thinks we should only study form when it is in actuality and not when it is without substance because without the substance, their is no movement or change.

    While looking for a particular passage to blog about I noticed that the current approach we take to our interactions and relationship with nature is motivated by very different goals. Aristotle is concerned with knowing for the sake of knowing as opposed to ourselves who generally think we study nature because of its usefulness or because we want to find solutions to environmental issues. Should we go about studying nature in the same way as Aristotle or does our different goal change something? If thinking of nature as a force of underlying change and motion is correct, do our distinctions of 'natural species' vs 'invasive species' or a 'wilderness' vs. 'spoiled' still hold? It is hard to see how one could argue they are genuine when they collapse and are shown to be meaningless. What about Aristotle's arguments do we find convincing and sound? Is his appeal to the way in which we speak about things reasonable and does it provide justification for defining what is natural by the way we talk? Isn't this problematic since we use concepts to refer to different things and in more than one way? If Aristotle is correct in his criticisms of the materialist view, what accounts for the success of physics, chemistry, and other sciences that follow the reductive materialist methodology?

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